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Abstract
We propose a quantitative model of lending standards with two reasons for ine¢ cient
credit: lendersmoral hazard from deposit insurance or government guarantees, and im-
perfect information about the persistence of asset price growth, which generates incorrect
but rational beliefs in the lenders. We calibrate the model to match recent credit boom-
bust episodes. Then we study which patterns of real estate price growth and banksbeliefs
could serve as early warning indicators of a crisis. Finally, we propose a Value-at-Risk
(VaR) rule to implement the capital requirements. The VaR framework ensures that the
probability of banks not having enough equity to cover their losses is maintained at a
certain level. Capital requirements should be state-contingent and lean against lenders
beliefs by tightening after periods of asset price growth. However, the relationship be-
tween asset price growth and nancial risk is not monotone and this should be integrated
in the setting of the capital requirements and early warning indicators.
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1 Introduction
Lax lending standards are usually blamed for over-exposing banks to risk.1 In this paper
we propose a model of lending standards and two reasons why lending standards may be
ine¢ cient. Then we show that the model can replicate empirical patterns of credit booms
and busts, use the model to conduct a quantitative study of early-warning risk indicators and
analyze a Value-at-Risk (VaR) rule to implement countercyclical capital requirements. We
show that capital requirements should be state-contingent and lean against lenders beliefs
by tightening after periods of asset price growth. However, the relationship between asset
price growth and nancial risk is not monotone, and this should be integrated in the setting
of the capital requirements and use of early-warning indicators. We apply our model to the
countercyclical capital bu¤er (CCB) proposed by Basel III for banks, but our model would
also apply to other nancial institutions that are now subject to capital requirements, such as
mutual funds or broker dealers.2
The rst reason lending standards are ine¢ cient in the model is a truncation in lenders
return function such that lenders can take on leverage, but their maximum loss is their initial
capital. This may be due to deposit insurance, government guarantees or limited liability.
Each of these generates moral hazard on the part of the lenders and lax lending standards at
all stages of the cycle relative to those of a regulator who fully absorbs all losses in excess of
banksequity.
The second friction leading to ine¢ cient credit standards is imperfect information about
the persistence of asset price growth. That is, asset prices are random and lenders cannot
perfectly anticipate how persistent the prices will be. To make decisions, they form rational
expectations using Bayesrule. Lenders may have episodes of incorrect but rational beliefs in
1For example, DellAriccia et al. (2012), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), Favilukis et al. (2012), Keys
et al. (2010 and 2012) and Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) provide evidence of lax standards before the recent
crisis. Corsetti et al. (1999) blame them for the Asian crises of the late 1990s.
2See Kramer et al. (2013) for a survey of capital rules on mutual funds, and Sacks (2013) for a study of SEC
rules for broker-dealers.
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which optimistic (pessimistic) expectations lead them to take on too much (little) risk. Surveys
of lending standards show that banksexpectations about economic activity and asset prices
are among the main drivers of lending standards (ECB 2013).3
The interaction of moral hazard and imperfect information reinforces the need for regulation,
as a regulator exposed to covering large depositor or bank creditor losses in the event that bank
beliefs about asset price growth are wrong will be more cautious than banks operating under
limited liability.
In our model there are lenders and heterogeneous borrowers who borrow to invest in projects
whose returns depend on exogenous asset price growth. Lenders select their credit standards to
ensure they only give credit to investors with a minimum level of idiosyncratic characteristics.
For example, through adequate screening the lender can ensure it lends only to borrowers with
a minimum skill level, credit score or past success record. Lending standards change with
expectations of asset price growth. When lenders expect growth to be high, all borrowers will
be more protable (bad investments are less bad in an environment of expected price increases)
and lenders relax their standards to save on screening costs and maximize their chances of
giving credit.
Capital requirements operate via two channels. First, higher requirements reduce leverage,
thus limiting the expansion of banks balance sheets during the credit boom and ensuring
banks can absorb more losses in a downturn. Second, capital requirements a¤ect the incentives
behind banks lending standard decisions via two opposing mechanisms. On one side, when
capital requirements go up, banksleverage and prots per unit of capital go down. Thus, there
is less incentive for banks to pay the cost of implementing high lending standards. On the other
side, because capital is more expensive than debt, when capital requirements go up the cost of
3We are trying to capture the recent experience of Deutsche Bank in Spain. In 2007, its research department
issued a report stating that "Spains economic success over the past years has been most impressive... GDP
growth is likely to remain above the euro-area average of just below 2% for several more years, allowing Spain
to climb past Italy and Germany in the rankings of GDP per capita by 2020" (Deutsche Bank 2007). What
happened in the following years suggests that Deutsche Bank had incorrectly overestimated the persistence of
Spanish growth and had overlent.
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banksfunds go up and banks need to raise their standards and be pickier to remain protable.
This last mechanism is quantitatively the strongest in our calibrated model.
Our model could be calibrated to any asset price or income growth process. Due to the
large role played by housing in the recent crisis, we calibrate it to match long-term averages of
housing prices and U.S. banking data. We show that it can replicate patterns of recent credit
boom episodes documented by Elekdag and Wu (2011).
We then study which patterns of real estate price growth and banksbeliefs could serve as
early-warning indicators of a crisis. We nd a non-linear relationship between real estate price
growth, banksoptimism and the risk of bank losses that are in excess of banksequity. There
are two opposing forces at work. Higher real estate price growth makes banks optimistic about
the persistence of price growth, causing them to lower lending standards and become more
exposed to risks. But these risks are also smaller because it is usually the case that rational
banks are more optimistic in times when it is less likely a bad shock will happen. Thus, the
maximum risks arise during price booms that occur in a middle ground. They are large enough
to generate optimistic bank beliefs, but not large enough such that the likelihood of a bad shock
is small. This middle ground in our calibrated model means two years of 5% price growth.
Finally, we analyze a VaR rule to implement the CCB. That is, under VaR the regulator
adjusts capital requirements to ensure the probability that banks do not have enough equity
to cover a given percentage of their losses is xed at a certain level. The VaR rule implied by
the model says that the regulator should increase the CCB when higher real estate prices lead
to higher risk. Again, however, this relationship is not monotone. Higher prices lead banks to
relax standards, thus building risk. However, if the price growth is very large, in our rational
model it is very unlikely that this comes from bad fundamentals, thus a hard landing is less
likely because the risk of a bad shock is smaller. Overall, we nd that usually the rst force
dominates and more optimism means more risk for the regulator. Thus, we nd that optimal
regulation should lean against banksbeliefs, tightening in periods of optimism after increased
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real estate price growth, and relaxing in periods of pessimism after price downturns. Although,
we do nd the rule should be applied non-linearly.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
presents the model. Section 4 characterizes the lending standards decision. Section 5 calibrates
the model and studies its quantitative properties. Section 6 analyzes which patterns of real
estate growth induce larger nancial risks. Section 7 contains the VaR implementation of the
CCB. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix denes the variables used to calibrate the model and
contains the numerical algorithm.
2 Related Work
Our paper is related to several literatures. In terms of objectives, it complements a growing
literature that studies the design of countercyclical capital regulation. Recent examples include
Aliaga-Díaz and Olivero (2011), Aliaga-Díaz et al. (2011), Angeloni and Faia (2013), Gersbach
and Rochet (2012), Malherbe (2013), Martinez-Miera and Suarez (2012), Repullo and Suarez
(2013), and Repullo (2013), among others. We believe that we contribute to this literature
through the mechanisms in our model, the models quantitative implications which allow us to
study counterfactuals, and the models applications to studying early-warning indicators of risk
and designing rules for the state-contingent capital requirements.
First, in terms of the mechanisms of our model, we analyze the use of capital regulation as
a macroprudential tool to dissuade banks from taking on excessive risk (lax lending standards)
during the build-up phase of the cycle. In this regard, the message of our paper is related to
papers that have discussed the connection between capital requirements and bank incentives
(for example, Allen et al. 2011, DellAriccia and Marquez 2006, Di Iasio 2013, Holmström
and Tirole 1997, Koehn and Santomero 1980, and Mehran and Thakor 2011). Our model does
not have the elegant closed form results of these papers, but in exchange it allows us to study
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quantitatively the interaction between limited liability and the way rational banks form beliefs
in an environment of imperfect information. This process of bank belief formation has not been
studied much in the banking literature.
Also in terms of the model, we propose a new way of modeling lending standards. In our
model tighter standards means that banks are pickier and raise the threshold that qualies a
borrower for credit. Most of the literature models lending standards as a creditworthiness test,
for example Broecker (1990), Gorton and He (2008), Ruckes (2004) or Thakor (1996). That is,
tighter standards means that the banks screen more and are more likely to discover the true
type of their borrowers. In those models the income threshold to qualify for credit does not
change. Instead, the amount of e¤ort to discover the type of the borrower changes. Thus, lax
standards in our model captures something di¤erent. In a model of lending standards as a
creditworthiness test, lax standards means banks qualify more borrowers because they did not
screen them enough to discover they were bad. In our model, lax standards means banks give
credit to lower quality borrowers even if they know the income of the borrower.4
Second, we analyze house price growth as an early-warning indicator of increased banking
system risk. Implementing the CCB requires that regulators identify data-based indicators that
illustrate when credit growth is excessive. Basel III proposes the deviation from trend in the
credit-to-GDP ratio as a primary indicator. However, Edge and Meisenzahl (2011) and Repullo
and Saurina (2011) present some drawbacks to reliance on this credit-to-GDP gap.5 Using
data from the EU, recent empirical work by Behn et al. (2013) shows that using equity prices,
house prices and banking sector variables in addition to aggregate credit variables improves
the predictive power of CCB early-warning models. Smith and Weiher (2012) also argue that
4Our modeling assumption is inspired by the new literature on trade (Melitz 2003, Eaton and Kortum 2004).
In new trade models, only the most productive rms decide to export, and in our model, the banks decide who
are the most productive borrowers qualied for a loan.
5Edge and Meisenzahl (2011) nd that real-time estimates of the credit-to-GDP gap di¤er from nal estimates
and that these di¤erences can be quite large. The authors argue that regulatory reliance on a real-time credit-
to-GDP gap can induce policy action when nal estimates of the gap would not, generating an unnecessary drag
on the economy. Repullo and Saurina (2011) argue that use of the credit-to-GDP gap may in fact worsen the
pro-cyclicality of capital regulation because for many countries the variable is negatively correlated with GDP
growth.
6
a key risk driver is the deviation of the house price index from its trend (a variable that may
capture over-optimistic expectations) and propose a methodology to implement countercyclical
capital requirements based upon this variable. Their analysis is empirical, while ours employs
a calibrated model.6
Third, we propose a VaR rule to set capital requirements. Basel III does not provide much
guidance on how to implement changes in the CCB other than some thresholds related to the
credit-to-GDP gap. In that regard we contribute to the debate on what rules to follow to
apply macroprudential policy tools. Our use of a VaR approach to design the regulatory capital
requirements complements models where individual banks use a VaR framework to determine
their desired capital levels, such as Di Iasio (2013), Gordy (2003) or Shin (2012). The VaR
framework captures the risks for regulators from imperfect information well and shows that the
relationship between asset price growth and nancial risk is not monotone.
3 Model
In every period t there is a continuum of mass one of borrowers and another continuum
of nancial institutions. We will refer to the nancial institutions as banks, although there is
nothing in the model that distinguishes them from private equity funds, mutual funds, broker
dealers or some other type of nancial institution that lends or invests. Our banks can be
thought of as a representative bank because we abstract from strategic interactions between
them.
Borrowers borrow from the banks and invest in projects whose return depends on asset
price growth. This price growth is exogenous in the model and subject to persistent and non-
persistent shocks. Only the sum of these two shocks is observable, and banks solve a signal
extraction problem to infer how persistent asset prices will be.
6Some countries, such as Switzerland and Norway, are using real estate price growth as an early-warning
indicator although their methodologies are not described in detail (Swiss National Bank 2013, Olsen 2013).
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We simplify the model on the borrowersside and on the price of credit to focus on the banks
lending standards decisions. The endogenous variables of our interest are lending standards,
the amount of credit, borrowersoutput, non-performing loans, delinquency rates, the quality
of banksportfolios, and banksreturn on equity.
3.1 Borrowers and Lending Standards
Borrowers are heterogeneous in the parameter ! and if they qualify for credit they receive
the amount Lt: A borrower of type ! who invests Lt dollars in a project receives earnings of
y(!;
pht
pht 1
; Lt) =
pht
pht 1
!Lt; (1)
where p
h
t
pht 1
is aggregate asset price growth. For example, we can think of the borrowers as
investors buying Lt
pht 1
units of real estate at the start of the period, then they sell those units at
the end of the period receiving as proceeds those units times the current real estate price
 
pht

.
The term ! captures the idiosyncratic characteristics of the project or investor. This implies
that for the same level of price growth

pht
pht 1

and investment (Lt) ; some investors are more
protable than others.
We assume that ! is distributed following a Pareto distribution with support [M;1) and
distribution function G (!) = 1    M
!

; where  > 0 is the shape parameter: As  increases,
the dispersion of ! decreases and is increasingly concentrated towards the lower boundM: The
Pareto assumption ts quite well rm-level data about the size and productivity distribution
of rms (Ghironi and Melitz 2005) as well as householdswealth distribution.
We assume that each bank randomly meets one borrower, observes the borrowers idiosyn-
cratic type !; and chooses lending standards to weed out the bad ones. To avoid modeling
competition between banks, we assume that borrowers cannot shop around at di¤erent banks.
We denote by t 2 [0;1) the banks lending standards. A bank with lending standards t
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denies credit to any borrower with ! < M + t; where M is the lower bound of the Pareto
distribution of !: Figure 1 plots the distribution of ! and the lending standards cuto¤: Only
borrowers to the right of M + t receive credit. As t increases, lending standards are higher
and the bank is more selective when lending because the bank has increased the minimum cuto¤
to give credit.
Insert Figure 1 here
Higher lending standards also imply that it is less likely the bank will meet with a borrower
worthy of receiving credit, because the probability Pr (! > M + t) is decreasing in t (holding
everything else constant). Moreover, we assume that implementing higher lending standards is
more costly than having lax standards (for example, due to increases in loan o¢ cerstime and
the costs of analyzing the borrower and her project). We assume that the cost of implementing
lending standards t when lending Lt is C (t)Lt. In the calibrated model we work with the
function
C (t) = t (2)
where  is a parameter.
We make some assumptions to avoid equilibria in which bad borrowers who know they
would not qualify for credit (they have ! < M + t) do not apply for credit, causing banks
to not need to spend resources on implementing standards. Ruckes (2004) discusses di¤erent
assumptions that give the same result. For example, assuming borrowers do not know their
types is equivalent to assuming good borrowers cannot signal their types and every borrower
applies for credit because she obtains a non-veriable control rent. Either of those assumptions,
together with assuming that borrowers do not have any initial capital and cannot save, give us
that borrowers always apply for the maximum credit.
To focus on the quantity of credit instead of on the price of credit, we assume that a
fraction   0 of the projects output, y(!; pht
pht 1
; Lt); goes to the borrower and the remaining
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fraction, (1 ); goes to the lender. The parameter  controls how the surplus from the lending
relationship is split between the lender and the borrower. It is the equivalent of the Nash
Bargaining parameter common in search models and we calibrate it to match data on interest
rates. We are assuming state contingent payo¤s to the lender. This can be justied if we
think of the lenders as banks using debt contracts including many covenants that make the
contract state contingent. We could also think of them as large banks or non-bank nancial
intermediaries investing through ways other than standard debt contracts. Boot and Thakor
(2010) document large increases in nancial intermediation through equity instruments. Several
recent models of banks, such as Bocola (2013), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) or Dedola et al.
(2013), also use equity contracts for simplicity. This assumption does not alter our results. The
two frictions that we study would also lead to ine¢ cient lending standards if payo¤s to the
lender were the same as those in a standard debt contract, that is, only state contingent in case
of borrowers default.7
3.2 Imperfect Information
Asset price growth

pht
pht 1

is exogenous and stochastic. It is unknown at the time of
decision-making in period t; but is observed at the end of the period. To capture imperfect
information, we assume that

pht
pht 1

is the sum of two unobservable parts, both with permanent
e¤ects, but one part is persistent while the other is not:
pht
pht 1
= exp (zt + t) (3)
7This result is available in an Appendix upon request.
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where zt is the persistent part that follows a two state Markov chain. That is, prices can have
high or low growth zt =

zL; zH
	
; with zL < zH ; and transition matrix
P =
264 PLL PLH
PHL PHH
375
The non-persistent part t is an i:i:d: Normal shock with mean
 2
2
and variance 2: This
assumption for the mean of t ensures that, conditional on zt;
pht
pht 1
follows a lognormal distrib-
ution whose conditional mean is exp (zt). We will refer to the t shock as a noise shock because
it prevents banks from perfectly observing zt and it is a shock to which agents should not react
because it is i:i:d.
Banks must make period t decisions before price growth is known, so they form expectations
about it from their past observations (we denote by t 1 the information set known at the start
of the t period). They do so by forecasting the unobservable state of the persistent part, zt;
from past observations of p
h
t
pht 1
using a Bayesian lter. We denote by pt 1  Pr(zt = zH jt 1)
the belief or prior of zt being in the high state in period t.
Banks start period t with a prior pt 1 and base their period t decisions on this prior. Once
pht
pht 1
is observed at the end of period t, agents compute their posterior beliefs about the state
of the persistent component, Pr(zt = zijt); using the Bayesian lter
Pr(zt = z
ijt) =
f(
pht
pht 1
jzt = zi) Pr(zt = zijt 1)
f(
pht
pht 1
jzt = zj) Pr(zt = zjjt 1) + f( p
h
t
pht 1
jzt = zi) Pr(zt = zijt 1)
; i = H;L
(4)
where the conditional density f( p
h
t
pht 1
jzt = zi) is the normal probability density
f(
pht
pht 1
jzt = zi) = 1

p
2
exp
 
  1
22

pht
pht 1
  zi + 
2

2
2!
(5)
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Banks form next periods prior pt by updating the posterior with the transition matrix P
pt = Pr(zt+1 = z
ijt) = Pr(zt = zijt)Pii + Pr(zt = zjjt)Pji (6)
This is the prior used to make decisions in period t+ 1.
We will use the notation Et 1 (:) to denote the expectation over
pht
pht 1
conditional on the
information known at the start of the period: That is, the expectation of the proceeds from the
project conditional on information at the start of period t is:
Et 1

y(!;
pht
pht 1
; Lt)

= Et 1

pht
pht 1

!Lt =
=

pt 1
 
exp
 
zH

+ (1  pt 1)
 
exp
 
zL

!Lt (7)
3.3 Banks
In every period t there is a continuum of mass one of risk neutral banks. Banks can fund
their loans with their own equity, Kt; whose gross cost we assume to be REt , or with deposits
or borrowings, Bt; that cost RBt . Banks are subject to a capital requirement,   0; such that
Lt  Bt +Kt (8)
Kt  Lt (9)
We assume that
REt  RBt :
That is, the cost of equity is larger than the cost of debt, for example because equity holders
face the risk of losing their investment while the debtholders are deposit insured or the govern-
ment provides a guarantee. This assumption is important because as the capital requirement
increases, bankscost of funds increases as well, since banks are nancing a larger share of their
12
loans with equity.8
Each bank lives for one period, meets one borrower and chooses its lending standards t.
If the borrower does not satisfy the lending standards (! < M + t) ; then the bank does not
lend and sits on its capital: If the borrower satises the standards (! M + t) then the bank
lends the amount Lt. At the end of the period
pht
pht 1
is realized, the return from the project is
observed, split between the bank and its borrower, and the borrower and the bank separate.
With the proceeds received, the bank pays its debtholders and the cost of implementing lending
standards. Any remaining proceeds then go to shareholders. Limited liability implies the net
prots can never be negative, as shareholders are not asked to inject more capital to cover
losses. The payo¤ for the bank from lending is

(1  )y(!; p
h
t
pht 1
; Lt) RBt Bt   C (t)Lt
+
where the notation (x)+ stands for the maximum operator, max (x; 0) :
For a given Kt and pt 1 the bank chooses lending standards to maximize expected share-
holdersvalue at the end of the period. Since lending is risky, we assume that prots from
the risky activity are discounted using the cost of equity while those from not taking risk are
discounted at the deposit rate. The banks take expectations over both ! (because the bank
does not know which type of borrower it will meet) and p
h
t
pht 1
: Banks start period t with a prior,
pt 1; inherited from the posterior of the previous cohort of bankers according to equation (6) :
8As discussed by Admati et al. (2013), it may be that higher capital requirements lower the cost of equity.
Our set up is a partial equilibrium model and cannot capture that e¤ect. This should not invalidate our analysis
if the cost of bank equity remains higher than the cost of raising debt or deposits for banks, which would probably
be the case if the deposits are insured while equity is more risky.
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The bank solves:
max
ft; Ltg10
M+tZ
M
1
RBt
KtdG (!) + Et 1
0@ 1Z
M+t
1
REt

(1  )y(!; p
h
t
pht 1
; Lt) RBt Bt   C (t)Lt
+1A dG (!)
(10)
s:t: (8) and (9)
where [M;M + t] is the region where the banks are not lending (Lt = 0).9
Given bankslinear utility, if the borrower is considered worthy of receiving credit, the bank
will always try to give her the maximum credit possible. Thus, equations (8) and (9) would
hold with equality. However, given that not all banks are giving credit, even for linear utility
banks, the model can match the empirical fact that the banking system holds capital above the
regulatory minimum, a fact discussed by Allen et al. (2011) among others.
We denote by P (!; p
h
t
pht 1
; Kt; t) the net prots at the end of the period for a bank with
capital Kt and lending standards t; matched with a borrower of type ! when asset price
growth is p
h
t
pht 1
P (!;
pht
pht 1
; Kt; t) =
8><>:

(1  )y(!; pht
pht 1
; Lt) RBt Bt   C (t)Lt
+
if ! M + t
Kt if ! < M + t
9>=>; (11)
We assume that at the end of each period, banksnet cash ows are aggregated to form next
periods aggregate capital Kt+1, which will be evenly split among the next cohort of banks.10
Kt+1 =
1Z
M
P (!;
pht
pht 1
; Kt; t)dG (!) (12)
9To ensure the objective function is nite, we require that  < :
10This assumption is without loss of generality since it is the leverage ratio
 
K
L

and not the level of capital
which a¤ects the choice of lending standards. That is, in our model small banks and large banks behave the
same way if both have the same leverage ratio.
14
4 The Lending Standards Decision
The bank chooses its lending standards, t, by solving equation (10), where the notation
(x)+ stands for the maximum operator, max (x; 0). The banks problem can thus be broken
into two separate cases, one in which the bank lends to borrower types that are expected to
default (max (x; 0) = 0) and one in which the bank does not lend to borrower types that are
expected to default (max (x; 0) = x). We dene the objective function for the bank when there
is expected default as:
W (t) =
M+tZ
M
1
RBt
KtdG (!) + Et 1
0B@ 1Z
b!(t)
1
REt
(1  )y(!; p
h
t
pht 1
; Lt) RBt Bt   C (t)Lt
1CA dG (!)
(13)
where b! (t)  M + t is the threshold borrower expected to generate a lending payo¤ for the
bank of zero. That is, b! (t) satises:
(1  )Et 1

pht
pht 1

(b! (t)) Lt  RBt Bt   C (t)Lt = 0 (14)
Likewise, we dene the objective function for the bank when there is no expected default
as:
V (t) =
M+tZ
M
1
RBt
KtdG (!)+Et 1
0@ 1Z
M+t
1
REt
(1  )y(!; p
h
t
pht 1
; Lt) RBt Bt   C (t)Lt
1A dG (!) :
(15)
where, implicitly, M + t > b! (t). The optimal choice of lending standards in each of these
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cases can be dened as follows:
t = argmax
t
W (t) (16)
and
t = argmax
t
V (t) : (17)
When there is lending with expected default, the following rst-order condition implicitly
denes t as long as b! (t )  (M + t ):
1
REt

1


C 0 (t )M
 (b! (t ))  = 1RBt M (M + t )  1 : (18)
This condition equates the discounted marginal revenue from lending to types above b! (t ) (the
left-hand side of equation 18) with the discounted marginal opportunity cost from lending to the
cuto¤ type, M +t (the right-hand side of equation 18). There are two important relationships
that can be observed in this optimality condition. First, because the marginal benet of lending
falls as the capital requirement rises, a higher capital requirement causes banks to want to lend
less. Hence they raise their lending standards to lend to fewer borrowers. Second, as banks
beliefs about real estate price growth deteriorate, banks will want to seek out higher quality
borrowers and will raise their lending standards in response.
For the case of lending without expected default, the rst-order condition that implicitly
denes t is:
1
REt

1

264 (1  )Et 1
h
pht
pht 1
i
(M + t )
  RBt (1  )  C (t )+
+

1


(M + t )C
0 (t )
375 = 1
RBt
: (19)
as long as (M + t ) > b! (t ). In this case, the rst-order condition equates the discounted
marginal revenue from lending to the cuto¤ type M + t (the left-hand side of equation 19)
with the discounted opportunity cost from lending to the cuto¤ type (the right-hand side of
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equation 19). Again, we see that the marginal benet of lending falls as the capital requirement
rises, implying banks will want to raise their standards to lend to fewer borrowers. Also, more
pessimistic beliefs about real estate price growth will again lead to banks to raise their lending
standards.
Banks choose the level of lending standards that maximizes value over these two cases. That
is, they will choose t such that:
t = arg maxft ; t g
fW (t ) ; V (t )g : (20)
Lending with expected default (t = t ) is costly as banks lose equity on the defaulted bor-
rowers. Banks will only choose to do so if the marginal costs of implementing standards such
that t = t are too high.
5 Quantitative Properties
In this section rst we calibrate the model to match long-term averages of real estate prices
and nancial data series. Then, we use recent data on credit booms and busts to illustrate how
imperfect information can generate rational credit booms and busts in the model.
5.1 Calibration
We calibrate one period in the model to be one year and set the exogenous cost of debt,
RBt ; to 2% which is the standard risk free rate in most macroeconomic calibrations. We set the
cost of bank equity, REt ; to 7% following Damodaran (2012). We assume a capital requirement
 of 4%, which was the Tier 1 capital requirement under Basel I.
We follow Ceron and Suarez (2006) to parameterize the stochastic process of equation (3).
They use Hamilton (1989) methodology to estimate a two-state Markov switching process
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for housing prices using ination-adjusted residential property price index data from fourteen
developed countries. We use their estimates for PLL, PHH and for the ratio between the good
and the bad persistent state, 1+z
H
1+zL
. This ratio pins down zL once we set zH ; which becomes
our scale parameter for the real estate price shock and is selected as explained below.
We select the remaining seven parameters (borrowersfraction of output , borrowerstech-
nology , screening cost function ; the real estate price shock in the high state zH , the volatility
of the i.i.d shock ; and the parameters of borrowersdistribution M and ) for the model
to jointly match the following facts for 1985-2006:11 1) Average fraction of reserves held in
U.S. banks asset portfolios (6.1%) (series: CASACBM027SBOG and TLAACBM027SBOG
from the FRED database); 2) Average real return on equity (13.1%) for U.S. banks (series:
USROE from the FRED database); 3) Average real return on assets (1.1%) for U.S. banks
(series: USROA from the FRED database); 4) Delinquency rate to match the historical default
rates computed by Moodys (8.1%) for B/B borrowers, which is the rating for the majority of
defaulting borrowers one year before default (Moodys 2002); 5) Average credit-to-GDP ratio
(81.1%) for Ireland, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. from Beck et al. (2009), which we proxy by
the ratio of borrower credit to borrower output in the model; 6 and 7) A 5% likelihood of noise
shocks implying losses larger than 82% of bank capital. This last fact is based on the estimation
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010b) that there is a 5% probability of a
member country facing a crisis in a given year, and that the last two U.S. nancial crises (the
Savings and Loan Crisis of 1988 and the recent crisis) cost regulators on average 82% of banks
capital as we discuss in Section 7. Table 1 contains the parameters that we obtain, Table 2
reports how well the model matches the targets.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
Our calibration implies a real estate price growth rate of 5% if the persistent component of
price growth is high and a 2% growth rate if it is low. Likewise, the invariant distribution of our
11The Appendix denes the model counterparts to the facts. It also discusses the numerical algorithm.
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calibrated Markov transition matrix P implies that in the long-run, the persistent component
of price growth is high 40% of the time low 60% of the time.
Figure 2 illustrates how banks update their beliefs given our calibration. It plots how, for a
given prior, observations of price growth lead to new posteriors.12 Three facts are interesting.
First, posterior beliefs are increasing in the asset price growth rate. That is, when banks see a
higher price growth rate, they attribute part of it to a higher likelihood that the persistent state
of price growth is zH . In other words, they always attribute part of the growth to fundamentals.
Second, a larger number of low posterior beliefs arise when the prior itself is also low. Similarly,
we observe a larger number of high posterior beliefs when the prior itself is also high. That is,
given our calibration, banks need to see large changes in price growth in order to drastically
update their beliefs. Third, it is possible, given di¤erent priors, that di¤erent observations of
house price growth can lead to the same posterior belief.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Figure 3 shows why beliefs matter. It plots bankslending standards and total credit for
di¤erent levels of the prior pt 1. Optimism leads to more credit.
Insert Figure 3 about here
5.2 Rational Credit Booms and Busts
Amodel with imperfect information can easily generate boom-bust patterns. In this section
we show so. Moreover, we test the ability of the calibrated model to match data. Elekdag and
Wu (2011) study data from 1960-2010 and identify 99 credit booms across 21 advanced and
12It presents a scatter plot of the transition of beliefs for a time series of 10,000 periods. The time series starts
with zt at its long-run mean and with banksprior pt consistent with that mean.
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43 emerging economies.13 Figure 4A shows the typical evolution of these booms over ve-year
windows centered at their peaks. The Figure distinguishes between di¤erent kinds of booms
(worst booms, abrupt booms and smooth booms) depending on how severe the following crises
were.
We ask what would happen in the model if we input a pattern of house price growth
n
pht
pht 1
o
driven by noise shocks t that allows the model to generate a credit boom matching the data
reported in Figure 4A. When
n
pht
pht 1
o
increases, then banksbeliefs rise (Figure 4C) and lending
standards fall as shown in Figure 4D. This leads to the credit increases observed in Figure 4A.
Return on assets in Figure 4E is initially high because banks are lending more and the noise
shocks t are positive. However, when the noise shocks disappear, the fraction of non-performing
loans rises (Figure 4F), bank prots fall (Figure 4E), and banks suddenly readjust expectations
about the persistent part of the aggregate component of income (Figure 4C). The combination
of banks tightening their lending standards and bank losses lowering banksavailable capital
leads to a severe contraction in credit, generating a bust.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Interestingly, the model predictions seem to be in line with the data. This motivates us to use
the model for the policy applications of the next sections.
6 Early Warning Indicators
Implementation of the Basel III countercyclical capital bu¤er requires national regulators
to identify data-based early-warning indicators of excessive credit growth. In this section, we
use our model framework to investigate which patterns of banksbeliefs and real estate price
13A credit boom is dened as an episode when the cyclical component of real credit is larger than 1.55 times
its standard deviation.
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growth may induce damaging credit booms. We measure risk by the size of losses in excess
of bank capital and by the likelihood of such losses. Interestingly, we nd that with rational
agents the more dangerous patterns are not those of maximum optimism, even if standards are
monotonically decreasing in optimism.
For a given realization of price growth, p
h
t
pht 1
, and bankslending standards, t, we can dene
with the function e!  pht
pht 1
; t

the borrower type receiving credit such that banks make losses
in excess of their capital for all nanced borrowers whose idiosyncratic component of income !
was lower than e!  pht
pht 1
; t

; that is,
(1  )y(e!; pht
pht 1
; Lt) RBt Bt   C (t)Lt  Kt = 0
or
e! pht
pht 1
; t

=
24 +RBt (1  ) + C (t)
(1  )

pht
pht 1

351= : (21)
The losses of the banking system in excess of bank capital are the sum of the losses on all
nanced borrowers (! > M + t) whose type is below e!  phtpht 1 ; t : We dene those losses as

t =  
e! pht
pht 1
;t
Z
M+t

(1  )y(!; p
h
t
pht 1
; Lt) RBt Bt   C (t)Lt  Kt

dG (!) (22)
where we multiply by a negative sign to have a positive value for the losses.
The size of bank losses depends on both how bad the price growth shock is, p
h
t
pht 1
, and on
bankslending standards, t: From Figure 3 we know that lending standards are a decreasing
function of beliefs. In Figure 5 we plot the probability of observing di¤erent losses (
t) in
excess of bank capital for di¤erent prior beliefs. Specically, we set 
t to 50%, 65%, 75%, or
100% of banksbeginning-of-period capital, compute s which is the size of the aggregate shock
21
bad enough to generate such losses, and then plot the probability of observing a shock worse
than s.
Insert Figure 5 here
In each of the four panels of Figure 5, we see that this probability is mostly increasing in the
prior, signifying that the likelihood of observing a crisis rises with bank optimism, as lending
standards are decreasing in bank optimism (Figure 3) and there is more lending. However, the
probabilities are non-monotonic in pt because for very high pt; even if the banks have very low
lending standards, it is very unlikely to see a shock bad enough to generate 50%, 65%, 75%, or
100% bank losses.
Thus, the non-monotonicity illustrates two forces a¤ecting the regulators potential losses:
as pt increases banks are more exposed to risks because their standards are lower, but these
risks are also smaller because rational banks have larger pt when it is less likely that a bad
shock happens. Over most of the pt range, more optimism means more risk for the regulator.
In other words, the more dangerous times are times of optimism where there are doubts about
the strength of the fundamentals.
Now that we have examined how the risk of regulator losses changes with the prior, we
turn to how the risk responds to di¤erent sequences of real estate price growth. In Figure 6,
we plot how the size of regulator losses changes for three scenarios of real estate price growth:
a sequence of two periods of 2%, 5% and 8% growth respectively. We specically examine
the size of regulator losses that occur with 2% probability. In all three scenarios, the starting
house price growth rate is at the mean of the invariant distribution of the stochastic process in
equation (3) and banks have the prior pt consistent with that mean.
Insert Figure 6 here
In Panel A, we nd that real estate price growth around 2% generates an increasing risk of
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regulator losses. This level of real estate price growth causes banks to slowly update their beliefs
and take on more risk. Panels B and C, however, show that the pattern of risk is non-monotonic.
The size of potential losses is highest once the rst real estate price growth shock is observed.
At faster rates of real estate price growth, banks update their beliefs relatively quickly. Hence,
more risk arises in the banking system after the initial shock. However, upon observing the
second shock, it is increasingly likely that the housing market is actually in the high growth
state and less likely it will see a housing price growth shock bad enough to generate large losses,
so risk falls in the second period. That is, as in the previous gure, there is a trade-o¤ between
the risk generated by laxer lending standards associated with higher growth, and the fact that if
the growth is very high, then it is very unlikely not to come from good fundamentals. Weighting
these two channels gives as a result that the sequence of 5% real estate price growth (Panel B)
induces the most risk.
Figure 7 redoes Figure 6 but focuses on the probability of a crisis (dened as regulator
losses of 100% or more of bank capital) for the same three scenarios of real estate price growth.
We observe patterns of regulator risk similar to those discussed in Figure 6. In Panel A, the
probability of a crisis is increasing for real estate price growth around 2%, due to a gradual
updating of bank beliefs. Panels B and C again display a non-monotone response to real estate
price growth rates of 5% and 8% respectively. The risk of crisis is again at a maximum for the
sequence of 5% real estate price growth (Panel B).
Insert Figure 7 here
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7 A Value-at-Risk Macroprudential Regulator
In this Section we analyze a Value at Risk (VaR) framework to set capital requirements
and leverage ratios.14 VaR is a tool commonly used to assess the risk of a portfolio. It measures
the minimum potential loss of a portfolio for a given condence interval. For example, a VaR of
$100 with a 98% condence level means that there is a 2% chance the portfolio will lose more
than $100 over a specied period.
We propose that the regulator sets the capital requirement, , using a VaR criteria such
that losses (
t) in excess of x% or more of banking system capital occur with condence level
1  .15 That is, the regulator chooses the capital requirement such that
Pr


t >
 x
100
Kt

jpt

= : (23)
Losses (
t) are dened as in equation (22).16 The fact that banks are leveraged institutions
imply that losses could exceed all banking capital.
The conditional expectation in (23) reects our assumption that the regulator computes the
probabilities over p
h
t
pht 1
conditional on the same prior, pt; that the banks are using to choose
their lending standards. In other words, we do not assume that the regulator has di¤erent
information about the state of the economy than private banks have. It would be easy to
incorporate the case in which the regulator has di¤erent information. In that case the capital
requirement would also change to encourage banks to behave according to the regulators priors.
14The Basel Committee seems to reason with a VaR framework. The Committee discussed that the goal of
regulation is to reduce from 5% to 1%, 2% or 3% the probability that a country faces a crisis in any given year
(Walter 2011).
15We can motivate this assumption using the fact that regulators, via deposit insurance or government guar-
antees, often cover losses in excess of bank equity. Similarly, we could motivate it in the case of a regulator that
does not like banks defaulting on their creditors.
16Laeven and Valencia (2012) estimate that the scal cost of the U.S. Savings and Loan crisis in 1988 was 3.7%
of GDP and the cost of the recent U.S. crisis was around 4.5% of GDP. These costs include bank recapitalizations
and other outlays related to restructuring the nancial sector, but do not include asset purchases. Using that
the ratio of equity to GDP in 1988 and 2008 was 3.5% and 7.7% respectively, we can convert the data on losses
to a percentage of bank equity. We obtain that the scal costs of those crises were between 50% and 100% of
bank capital. This is the range we will use for x%.
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Table 3 compares how di¤erent capital requirements would a¤ect regulator losses for VaR
condence levels of 98%, 95% and 90%.17 The rst row of the table reports the regulator losses
for each VaR condence level for our benchmark calibration of a 4% capital requirement.
Insert Table 3 here
As the capital requirement rises, the size of potential regulator losses falls for each VaR con-
dence level. There are two channels through which the capital requirement operates. First,
it operates on a quantity dimension. Raising the capital requirement lowers the amount of
leverage banks can use to nance a loan. In the event of a bad real estate price shock, this
means that capital is thus able to absorb more of the losses. Second, the capital requirement
operates on a price dimension. Because we assumed that for banks raising capital is a more
expensive form of nance than borrowing
 
REt  RBt

, when higher capital requirements force
banks to nance a larger set of their lending with equity then banks need to raise their lending
standards to lend to borrowers who are more protable. That is, when bankscosts increase,
banks need to be more selective in terms of to which investors to lend.
Figure 8 plots the optimal capital requirement as a function of bank beliefs for a target
losses of 75% and 100% to ensure that the probability of observing a crisis is xed at 2%.18
Insert Figure 8 here
Figure 8 shows that capital requirements should lean against bank beliefs. In general, the VaR
regulator should raise capital requirements when the banks are more optimistic and therefore
more exposed to bad shocks. When the banks are more pessimistic and less exposed, they need
lower capital requirements. However, rational banks usually have optimistic beliefs when it
17To generate the table, banksprior is set to 0.75, and regulator losses are computed at the level of house
price growth such that an equivalent or worse loss occurs 2%, 5% or 10% of the time.
18When discussing Basel III, the Basel Committee claims that there is a 5% probability of a Basel Committee
member country facing a crisis in any given year and discusses reducing this probability by 1%, 2% or 3% (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 2010a).
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is less likely that a bad shock will happen. This force generates a non-monotone response of
capital requirements.
Figure 8 also shows the e¤ect of the regulators loss tolerance. When the tolerance switches
from 75% to 100% of bank capital, the regulator is allowing larger losses to happen within
its 98% condence interval. Because these 100% losses happen less frequently in general, the
capital requirements needed to combat them are lower than those required to combat losses of
75%.
To illustrate the link between house price growth and VaR policy based upon bank beliefs, we
plot in Figure 9 the VaR capital requirement corresponding to the house price growth scenarios
we presented in Section 6: a sequence of two periods of 2%, 5% and 8% growth respectively.
Insert Figure 9 here
In each panel of Figure 9, the VaR capital requirement very closely follows the pattern of risk
observed in the corresponding panels of Figures 6 and 7. In Panel A, the gradual increase in
bank risk in response to 2% house price growth is met with a gradual increase in the capital
requirement. In Panels B and C, the non-monotone response of risk means that the VaR
capital requirement is non-monotone as well. As before, this non-monotonicity arises because
optimistic banks lower their lending standards and become more exposed to bad shocks, but
the risk of those bad shocks is smaller since rational bankers only become optimistic when it is
less likely that a bad shock occurs. We also observe in Figure 9 that a house price growth rate
of 5% (Panel B) requires a higher VaR capital requirement than a house price growth rate of
8% (Panel C). This occurs because risk is higher in the case of a 5% house price growth rate.
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8 Conclusions
This paper proposed a quantitative model of lending standards with two frictions generat-
ing ine¢ cient credit: 1) lendersmoral hazard from limited liability (that can also be interpreted
as deposit insurance or government guarantees), and 2) imperfect information about the per-
sistence of real estate price growth, which generates the possibility of rational mistakes. We
studied which patterns of real estate price growth and banksbeliefs could serve as early warn-
ing indicators of a crisis. With rational agents, even if lending standards are monotonically
decreasing in optimism, the more dangerous booms are not monotonically increasing in opti-
mism. When the banks are more optimistic they are more exposed to bad shocks. However
rational banks usually have optimistic beliefs when it is less likely that a bad shock happens.
Finally, we proposed a Value at Risk (VaR) rule to implement countercyclical capital re-
quirements. Capital requirements can incentivize banks to pick the socially optimal level of
lending standards. Capital requirements should be state-contingent and lean against lenders
beliefs by tightening in periods of price optimism. However, they should be not monotone, as
risk is not monotone in beliefs.
Future extensions of this paper may include bringing the model into a general equilibrium
setting, analyzing the welfare implications of the VaR rule, and studying cases in which banks
beliefs could be irrational and diverge from those of a rational regulator.
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Appendix
A. Model Denitions
We dene the delinquency rate in the model as the fraction of borrowers receiving credit
who cannot repay the principal of the loan
!^Z
M+
g (!) d!
1Z
M+
g (!) d!
; (24)
where !^ is dened as the borrower type who is just able to repay the loan principal
(1  )y(!^; p
h
t
pht 1
; Lt)  Lt = 0: (25)
We dene return on equity and return on assets as
ROEt =
Kt+1  Kt
Kt
; (26)
ROA =
Kt+1  Kt
assets
= ROE  Kt
assets
; (27)
with
assets =
M+Z
M
Ktg (!) d! +
1Z
M+
Ltg (!) d!: (28)
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We dene the investor credit-to-output ratio as total credit over total output
1Z
M+
Ltg (!) d!
1Z
M+
y(!;
pht
pht 1
; Lt)g (!) d!
: (29)
We dene the fraction of reserves in the representative banks asset portfolio as total reserves
divided by total assets
M+Z
M
Ktg (!) d!
assets
: (30)
Lastly, we dene regulator losses in equation (22) :
B. Numerical Algorithm
1. Initialize the prior and level of capital. We set the initial prior, pt, to its invariant distri-
bution value of 40%. Next, we normalize starting capital, K0, to one. This assumption
is without loss of generality because in the model it is the leverage ratio, and not the
absolute level of capital, which a¤ects the choice of lending standards, t.
2. Compute expected house price growth, Et 1
h
pht
pht 1
i
, as described in equation (7).
3. Compute the optimal choice of lending standards using equations (18)  (20).
4. Draw a house price growth shock from the stochastic process described in Section 3:2.19
5. Using the optimal t from step 3 and the value of the house price growth shock, compute
the model values described in Appendix A.
19For the purposes of calibrating the model and reporting comparative statics, the house price growth shock
was set to its long-run mean.
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6. Use the house price growth shock to compute banksupdated beliefs (equations 4   6).
Repeat steps 2-6.
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Tables
Table 1: Parameters
M = 1:4  = 1:3  = 0:1
 = 0:116 PHH = 0:96 PLL = 0:97
 = 0:04  = 0:03 K0 = 1
zH = 0:0488 zL =  0:0231  = 0:036
RBt = 1:02 R
E
t = 1:07 for all t
Note: For calibration details see Section 5.1
Table 2: Calibration
Data Model
1) Reserves as fraction of banksasset portfolios 6.1% 5.8%
2) ROE 13.1% 13.2%
3) ROA 1.1% 1.3%
4) Delinquency rate 8.1% 7.7%
5) Credit-to-output ratio 81.1% 82.1%
6) Probability of crisis 5% 5%
7) Losses during crisis (as a % of bankscapital) 82% 86%
Note: For calibration details see Section 5.1
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Table 3: Regulator Losses, the Capital
Requirement and Value-at-Risk
Value-at-Risk Condence Level: 98% 95% 90%
Capital Requirement Regulator Losses
4.0% 125% 103% 83%
4.5% 105% 86% 69%
5.0% 90% 74% 59%
5.5% 80% 66% 52%
6.0% 73% 60% 48%
Note: This table computes the losses as a percent of total
bank equity that the regulator could su¤er. For more details,
see Section 7.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Borrowers and Lending Standards. This picture plots the
Pareto distribution of borrowersidiosyncratic characteristics (!) and how lending standards (M + )
are modeled as a cut-o¤ such that no borrower below it qualies for credit.
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Figure 2: Transition of Beliefs for Di¤erent Observations of House Price Growth.
This gure plots banksposterior belief about being in the high state of the economy as a function
of banksprior and di¤erent observations of house price growth. The data come from simulating the
stochastic process described in Section 3:2 for 10,000 periods.
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Figure 3: Counteryclical Lending Standards and Procyclical Credit. This Figure
plots lending standards and credit as a function of the prior about the persistent part of price growth,
zt.
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Figure 4: Credit Booms in the Model and in the Data. This Figure plots empirical
patterns documented by Elekdag and Wu (2011) and a model-simulated credit boom-bust. Model
computations are explained in Section 5.
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Figure 5: BanksBeliefs and Probability of Regulator Losses. This gure plots the
probability that the regulator experiences losses of at least 50%, 65%, 75%, or 100% of banking system
capital as a function of the prior about the persistent component of house price growth.
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Figure 6: House Price Dynamics and Regulator Losses. This gure plots regulator
losses as a percentage of banking system capital that occur 2% of the time for di¤erent house price
growth rates.
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Figure 7: House Price Dynamics and Probability of Crisis. This gure plots the
probability of regulator losses of 100% or more of banking system capital for di¤erent house price
growth rates.
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Figure 8: Capital Requirements and BanksBeliefs. This gure plots, as a function of
the prior about the persistent part of price growth, the capital requirement such that the probability
of the regulator losing more than 75% or 100% of banking system capital is xed at 2%.
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Figure 9: House Price Dynamics and Value-at-Risk Capital Requirements. This
gure plots the Value-at-Risk capital requirement such that the probability of the regulator losing
more than 75% or 100% of banking system capital is xed at 2% for di¤erent house price growth rates.
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